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Introduction1
As of April 2022, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) tallied 3,218 international
investment treaties, of which 2,558 are in
force.2 Investors in extractive industries
(the oil, gas, and mining sectors) have used
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
mechanisms embedded in these treaties to challenge a wide range of host state actions
and inactions that have allegedly negatively affected their investments. Those claims,
and the threats thereof, restrict states’ ability to maximize the benefits, and their ability
to limit environmental and social harms, resulting from the exploitation of natural
resources. This briefing note provides an introduction to international investment law, to
assist stakeholders in grasping its diverse and significant implications for the governance
of investments in extractive industries.

Key Points Addressed in this Paper
▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

International investment treaties impose obligations and restrictions on states
regarding their treatment of foreign investors and foreign-owned investments.
Investment treaties protect the economic interests of a broad range of covered
“investors” and “investments,” the vague definitions of which open the door to abuse
of similarly-broad treaty protections.
Investor protections provided under investment treaties are a one-way mechanism—
while they are enforced through the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
mechanisms, there are no obligations for investors.
Efforts by states to develop, refine, and implement their laws and policies governing
extractive industry investments—whether through legislative instruments, court
decisions, contract provisions, or administrative actions—have been challenged
under investment treaties through ISDS.
The perspectives of investment-impacted third-parties (such as local communities or
Indigenous groups) are often central to the issues at hand in ISDS claims, yet means
of third-party participation in investment dispute proceedings are extremely limited.
States should carefully consider their reasons for signing investment treaties and
define the scope and content of these treaties in order to achieve their policy aims and
protect their ability to regulate in the public interest and in favor of the environment.
Reform options vary with respect to existing and new treaties, but in all cases, states
can unilaterally or jointly take steps, including clarifying or terminating existing
treaties and participating in international reform discussions, to align their treaties
and the broader investment regime with their sustainable development objectives
and human rights obligations, as well as preserve policy space.
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1 The structure of this briefing is based
on that of a briefing on agricultural
investments and international investment
law, published by CCSI, IISD, and IIED:
see Jesse Coleman, Sarah Brewin, and
Thierry Berger, Agricultural Investments
Under International Investment Law, (CCSI,
IISD, and IIED, 2019) https://ccsi.columbia.
edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/
our%20focus/CCSI-IIED-IISD_AgriculturalInvestments-under-IIL.pdf.
2 UNCTAD, International Investment
Agreement Navigator, https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements, last
checked 26 April 2022.
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International Investment Treaties
and the Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Mechanism (ISDS)3
Formed through a complex web of more than 3,000
Figure 1: Breakdown by Sector of Known ISDS Cases (note that
treaties, international investment law is typically
“mining and quarrying” includes gas and oil sectors)9
regarded as one of the fastest-developing areas of
Agriculture, forestry and
public international law. Investment treaties are
fishing
3.8%
8.9%
Mining and quarrying
international agreements concluded between states
4.8%
15.2%
Manufacturing
that impose obligations and restrictions on countries
Eletricity, gas, steam and
air conditioning supply
regarding their treatment of foreign investors and
9.3%
Water supply; sewerage,
foreign-owned investments. The treaties’ obligations
waste management and
remediation activities
generally apply to all branches of government (i.e.,
13.8%
Construction
6.8%
legislative, executive, and judicial) and all levels of
Transportation and storage
government (i.e., local/municipal, state/provincial/
Information and
5.1%
communication
departmental, and federal/national). These treaties
Financial and insurance
are designed to restrict the ability of host states to
activities
10%
act in certain ways that harm the rights or interests
Real estate activities
17.9%
4.4%
Other
of foreign investors who seek to invest, or who
have invested, in the host country’s territory.
Consequently, when a state has signed an investment treaty, that state’s ability to adopt,
revise, repeal, and enforce laws, regulations, and policies that affect foreign investors
or investments is subject to the state’s obligations under that treaty (which contains no
obligations for investors).
Investors can enforce the obligations established by investment treaties through the treaties’
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. ISDS allows investors to bring claims
directly against host states, seeking damages for alleged impacts of governments’ actions or
inactions (whether directly or indirectly affected), typically without the involvement of the
investor’s home state. This differs from other areas of international economic law, such as
under the World Trade Organization’s agreements, in which only states are given the ability
to challenge other states for violating their treaty commitments. Some human rights treaties
also enable private actors to file claims against states, but human rights tribunals generally
require those claimants to first exhaust available domestic law remedies, whereas ISDS
tribunals typically permit claimants to head directly to international arbitration.
Foreign investors have relied on investment treaties to challenge a range of government
conduct with regard to the establishment, approval, operation, and termination of
investments in extractive industries. As of January 2021, 1,104 known treaty-based ISDS
cases had been lodged; at least 16%4 of these cases concerned investments in extractive
industries, making this sector the second most disputed in international investment
arbitration (see Figure 1).5 Nearly 30% of the 66 new cases the International Center for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) registered in 2021 involved the oil, gas, and
mining sector, making extractive industries the most disputed sector that year.6 The Energy
Charter Treaty (1994), with 53 current members, is the most frequently invoked treaty,
having registered 145 publicly known cases between 2001 and 2021.7
Of the 354 known treaty-based cases that were pending as of December 2020, 58 related to
the extractive industries (or just shy of 17%). These cases include 41 related to mining and
quarrying, and 17 related to the extraction of crude petroleum and gas.8
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

3 For a more detailed overview of
investment treaties and ISDS, see Primer
on International Investment Treaties and
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (CCSI,
January 2022).
4 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2021:
Investing in Sustainable Recovery (2021),
https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/wir2021_en.pdf, p. 129.
5 This analysis is based on the information
available through UNCTAD’s Investment
Dispute Settlement Navigator, available at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
ISDS (updated as of December 30, 2020).
6 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload—Statistics (2022),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/
files/documents/The_ICSID_Caseload_
Statistics.1_Edition_ENG.pdf, p. 7.
7 “Statistics,” Energy Charter Treaty,
1 December 2021 https://www.
energychartertreaty.org/cases/statistics/
(accessed 14 February 2022).
8 UNCTAD, Investment Dispute
Settlement Navigator, available at http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS
(updated as of December 31, 2020).
9 Ibid.
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Features
of ISDS

ISDS differs in several important ways from the dispute settlement mechanisms typically
found in domestic court systems (see Table 1).
Table 1: Differences between Proceedings in Domestic Court Systems and in ISDS
Domestic Court System

ISDS

Who can bring
a claim?

Domestic law and/or any relevant contract determine who
can bring claims; typically, they allow, e.g.:
▶ claims by states against investors;
▶ claims by investors against states; and
▶ claims by citizens/communities against investors; and
▶ claims by citizens/communities against states regarding
a state’s regulation of, or failure to regulate, investors.

Investors covered by an investment treaty can bring claims against states.
States cannot initi-ate ISDS claims against investors (even the pos-sibility
of counterclaims is extremely circum-scribed), and citizens/communities
cannot bring claims against investors or the state. Broad definitions of
covered investors results in host government measures being challenged by
a large range of individuals and entities, and al-lows for “treaty shopping,”
in which an investor routes its investment through a shell company in order
to benefit from the protections of a partic-ular country’s treaty.

Who decides
the claim?

Judges, who are subject to strict requirements regarding
their independence and impartiality.

Private arbitrators, typically appointed by the parties to the dispute, and
generally not governed by any robust or mandatory codes of conduct.

Where are
cases decided?

In administrative or judicial tribunals or courts, located in
the host country.

In arbitral proceedings often conducted outside of the host country.

Are disputes
open to the
public? Do
they allow
public
participation?

Court proceedings in domestic legal systems are often open
to the public.
In many systems, interested and/or affected individu-als or
entities have the possibility to
▶ make amicus curiae submissions; and/or
▶ join disputes as a party.

Under the vast majority of treaties, ISDS proceedings can be closed to the
public.
Few tribunals have allowed interested or affected individuals or entities to
participate as amicus curiae. Non-parties are otherwise unable to join the
proceedings.

What
substantive
law is applied?

Domestic law (including its choice of law rules), which may
also incorporate international law.

The law of the treaty, which is the treaty itself and any law specified in the
treaty, and international law.

If there is a contract, the law specified in the contract
(commonly the law of the host state) will typically be
applied.

When deciding contract-based disputes, the tribunal will also apply the law
of the contract, and may also apply principles of international law to the
contract.

Domestic procedural law will apply to address potentially
outcome-determinative issues such as:
▶ who has standing to bring claims;
▶ whether claims are ripe;
▶ whether claims are timely or have been filed too late;
and
▶ whether evidence is admissible.

ISDS proceedings are governed by rules specified in the relevant investment
treaty and any applicable rules of arbitration.

Remedies are generally specified in domestic law or
contract, and can include
▶ injunctive relief,
▶ declaratory relief,
▶ specific performance,
▶ restitution,
▶ compensation, and
▶ punitive damages.

Remedies are usually in the form of compensation; but tribunals may, and
have, also ordered other remedies.

Domestic legal systems often provide some mechanisms for
appeal. Errors of fact and/or law by a lower court or tribunal
are common bases for appeal.

Decisions and/or awards are not subject to appeal. They can only be
challenged on specific, narrow, procedural grounds. Awards generally
cannot be challenged on the ground that the tribunal made an error of fact
or law.

What
procedural law
is applied?

What are the
remedies?

Is there a
possibility of
appeal?

Domestic rules of procedure generally do not govern ISDS proceedings.

Some treaties prohibit certain types of remedies such as orders requiring
states to abandon challenged measures, or awards of punitive damages.

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
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Impacts of Investment Treaties
and ISDS on the Governance of
Extractive Industries
Investment treaties and ISDS have a particularly pronounced impact on the domestic
governance of extractive industries. Mined materials are often extracted, processed,
refined, and distributed by large multinational corporations who are protected under
international investment treaties through their home states. These large-scale extractive
projects have significant long-term impacts on a host-state’s environmental, social,
economic, and geopolitical conditions.10 Management of extractives thus involves a
wide range of legal and policy spheres, and robust institutions and processes to govern
interactions between those spheres. Positive outcomes for host states and their citizens
depend, among other things, on strategy and planning within and across government
agencies at national and local levels; rights-compliant engagement with project-affected
communities and other stakeholders; mechanisms for ensuring integrity of public
officials and safeguards against corruption and capture; quality impact assessments
able to identify potential harms and suggest and evaluate options for avoiding or
mitigating those harms; effective processes for granting (and challenging) licenses or
permits according to law; and the ability of a government to respond and act in the face
of changed circumstances.
Several efforts by states to develop, refine, and implement their laws and policies
governing extractive industry investments – whether through legislative instruments,
court decisions, contract provisions, or administrative actions – have been challenged
by investors under investment treaties through ISDS. Those claims, in turn, have
exposed host states to potentially significant costs in terms of litigation expenses and/or
liabilities. For investments in the extractive industries in particular, the sums at stake can
be staggering, diverting resources away from other domestic priorities.11 Additionally,
ISDS claims can exacerbate the political, legal, and economic challenges associated with
effective, open, and multi-dimensional regulation of extractive industry projects.
A significant majority of extractives cases are filed against developing countries.
Developing countries are more exposed to claims than developed country counterparties
because more investment in their extractive industry projects is covered by investment
treaties.12 Moreover, foreign investment in extractive industries in developing countries
has preceded (often in response to the support, urging, and pressure of developed states)
the development and effective deployment of systems for governing the environmental,
human rights, and economic dimensions of those projects.13 About 86% of extractives
cases (and 83% of all pending extractives cases as of 2020) were brought against a country
with a gross national income (GNI) per capita of less than USD 12,535.14

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

10 For further reading on the extractives
sector, IIAs, and corporate power, see
Manuel Pérez-Rocha, Missing from the
Climate Talks: Corporate Powers to Sue
Governments Over Extractives Policies
(2021); and Lea di Salvatore, InvestorState Disputes in the Fossil Fuel Industry
(2021) IISD https://www.iisd.org/system/
files/2022-01/investor%E2%80%93statedisputes-fossil-fuel-industry.pdf.
11 See Table 2 “Examples of Awards and
Expenses for Litigation and Arbitration in
Extractive Industry ISDS Cases” and Table
3: “Examples of Extractives Cases in which
the Rights of Third Parties were Raised”.
12 Zoe Phillips Williams, Risky Business or
Risky Politics: What Explains Investor-State
Disputes? (Berlin: 2016) https://opus4.
kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/deliver/
index/docId/2369/file/Dissertation_
Williams_Zoe.pdf.
13 For instance, Colombia issued its first
National Action Plan on Human Rights
and Business in 2015. One of the main
objectives of the policy was contributing
to the implementation of due diligence
as a company management process and
as a basis for responsible investment
in the country. By then, a great number
of extractive industry projects with
foreign capital had already been granted
concessions and were conducting
exploration and exploitation activities.
See Colombia Avanza, Plan Nacional
de Acción sobre Derechos Humanos y
Empresas, Consejería DDHH y Todos Por Un
Nuevo País, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/
default/files/Documents/Issues/Business/
NationalPlans/PNA_Colombia_9dic.pdf.
14 This analysis is based on the
information available through UNCTAD’s
Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/ISDS (updated as of December
31, 2020). 6% were brought against lowincome countries, i.e. those with a gross
national income (GNI) per capita of $1,035
or less in 2019; 23% were brought against
lower middle income countries, i.e. those
with a GNI per capita between $1,036 and
$4,4045 in 2019; and 57% were brought
against upper-middle income countries,
i.e. those with a GNI per capita between
$4,046 and $12,535 in 2019. GNI brackets
and country classifications are based on
World Bank lending categories for the 2019
fiscal year. For further information, see
here: http://data.worldbank.org/about/
country-and-lending-groups.
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Cases and their Implications
for Extractive Sector
Governance
Among the cases concerning investments in the extractive industries sector, investors
have challenged the following types of government acts and omissions:
▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

New and stronger environmental regulations or energy phase-outs (e.g., Glamis Gold,
Ltd. v. United States 2003; Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Canada 2013; Rockhopper v. Italy
2017; Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany (II) 2012; Westmoreland
Coal Company v. Canada (II) 2019; RWE v. the Netherlands 2021) (see Box 1);
Requirements to consult with communities or compensate third-parties for harms
caused (e.g., Copper Mesa v. Ecuador 2012; Kappes, Cassiday & Associates (KCA) v.
Guatemala 2018; Gran Colombia Gold v. Colombia 2018; South32 S.A. v. Colombia 2020);
Termination of contracts with investors (e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corporation and
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador 2012; IMING v. KPA (Kosovo)
2019);
Revocation/ termination of permits authorizing investors’ operations (e.g., Gold
Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela 2009; Copper Mesa v. Ecuador 2011; Bear Creek Mining v. Peru
2014; Cosigo Resources and others v. Colombia 2016; Dominion Minerals v. Panama
2016; Nachingwea and Ntaka Nickel v. Tanzania 2020; Winshear Gold v. Tanzania 2020;
Montero Mining v. Tanzania 2021);
Requirements to perform environmental impact assessments, or reapply for an
environmental or social license (e.g., Ascent Resources v. Slovenia 2019; South32 S.A. v.
Colombia 2020; Menankoto SARL v. Republic of Mali 2021);
Decisions not to grant or renew permits and/or enforcement of existing environmental
regulations (e.g., Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador 2009; Clayton and Bilcon of
Delaware Inc. v. Canada 2008; Eco Oro Minerals Corp. v. Colombia 2016; Navodaya
Trading DMCC v. Gabonese Republic 2018; Renco v. Peru (II) 2018; Odyssey v. Mexico
2019; Legacy Vulcan v. Mexico 2019; Alamos Gold v. Turkey 2021);
Changes to fiscal regimes (including changes in interpretations of and enforcement
strategies for existing laws and regulations), the imposition of tax-related measures
or royalties, and associated economic measures (e.g., Occidental Exploration and
Production Company v. Ecuador 2004; Perenco Ecuador Limited v. Ecuador 2008;
Glencore v. Colombia 2016; Quiborax v. Bolivia 2015);
Requirements to purchase local goods and services or to invest in research and
development (e.g., Mobil Investments Canada, Inc. v. Canada 2015);
Moratoria on issuing permits (e.g., Lone Pine v. Canada 2013; Pac Rim Cayman LLC v.
El Salvador 2009);
Conduct during negotiation or renegotiation of contracts (e.g., PSEG v. Turkey 2009)
(See Box 2).

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
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BOX 1: Preserving Regulatory Space to Address the Climate Crisis15
Governments are moving to transition their economies away from fossil fuels to address the climate emergency.
This transition must invariably constrain the sector’s ability to profit from non-renewable energy reserves. When
protected by a treaty with ISDS, companies in the fossil fuel industries may seek compensation from states as
a result of the climate-driven need to strand fossil fuel assets. Companies have brought (or threatened) cases
against government measures including: Quebec’s 2011 moratorium on fracking in the St. Lawrence River basin
(Lone Pine Resources v. Canada); the denial of a pipeline construction permit on the grounds that the project was
counter to the government’s climate commitments (Transcanada v. United States); a plan by Alberta’s provincial
government to phase out coal-fired power plants in the province by 2030 (Westmoreland v. Canada I & II); a draft
law phasing out fossil fuel extraction in France by 2040 (Vermillion v. France); a government decision to ban coalbased power generation in the Netherlands by 2030 (RWE v. the Netherlands and Uniper v. the Netherlands).
As efforts to combat climate change become more urgent, stranded fossil fuel assets will necessarily rise as
well. Foreign investors may resort to ISDS to protect themselves from shouldering the financial burden of
this necessary and inevitable economic transition. If those claims succeed, it will be governments (and their
taxpayers) who will pay, through the outsized costs of ISDS awards, rather than the fossil fuel companies who
continue to defy climate science and to fight necessary regulation.
Under investment treaties, the fact that a measure was adopted in good faith and for a
legitimate, public interest purpose generally does not operate as a defense to claims, nor
does the fact that a measure is consistent with, or even required under, domestic law or
other areas of international law (like the Paris Agreement on Climate Change or international
human rights law). Consequently, governments attempting to develop, refine, strengthen,
and enforce their legal frameworks governing extractive industries may face exposure
to claims and liability when those actions negatively affect the rights, or even the mere
“expectations” of foreign investors. Below are just a few ways in which treaty protections
pose threats to regulating against harmful investor behavior.

BOX 2: Asymmetric Obligations in PSEG v. Turkey
The dispute concerned the development of a mining and power plant project, for which an implementation
contract had been initialed by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources following their approval of the
investor’s feasibility study. While awaiting the next step in the contract’s approval process to be completed, the
investor revised its mining plan and made several changes to its proposed project. Although the implementation
contract was approved (based largely on the original feasibility study), the government sought to renegotiate the
contract based on some of the investor’s proposed changes. The tribunal concluded that, while the government
had not behaved in “bad faith”, and the negotiations were handled competently “on occasion”, the government
had been “negligent” and its “attitudes and policies” had changed during its interactions with the investor. This
was sufficient to constitute a breach of the FET obligation. The tribunal ordered the government to compensate the
investor for USD 9 million in costs expended during the pre-contract and pre-project phase (plus interest), and bear
65% of the disputing parties’ roughly USD 21 million in legal and arbitration costs.

Protecting Illegal Investments or Contractual Provisions
Where a host state government enters into an investment contract in breach of domestic law, for
example through an ultra vires act of a government official (i.e. one that was beyond its power
or authority), such a contract will often be deemed void ab initio (or void “from the beginning”),
voidable, or unenforceable in domestic legal systems (irrespective of whether the government
was knowingly or negligently at fault). Some ISDS tribunals have, however, determined that the
government is estopped or precluded from arguing that the investor-state contract is illegal and
hence unenforceable under domestic law and the investment treaty.16 By binding governments
to illegal or ultra vires contracts, tribunals can override domestic law norms and give legal force
to rights that would not otherwise exist under the domestic legal framework.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

15 Lise Johnson, “ International
Investment Agreements and Climate
Change: The Potential for Investor-State
Conflicts and Possible Strategies for
Minimizing It,” (2013) 39 Environmental
Law Revue 11147; Kyla Tienhaara,
“Regulatory Chill in a Warming World : The
Threat to Climate Policy Posed by InvestorState Dispute Settlement,” Transnational
Environmental Law 2, (2018) 229-250.
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Limiting Use of Tools for Leveraging Investment for Sustainable Development
Many investment treaties restrict the use of performance requirements, removing an
essential means for host governments to try to ensure that the investment leads to broader
socioeconomic development and social inclusion, for example, thus benefiting not only
the investor but also the citizens of the host state. Investment tribunals have further
strengthened restrictions on performance requirements by adopting broad interpretations
of their scope. (See Box 3).

BOX 3: Broad Interpretations of Restrictions in Mobil v. Canada
Following the discovery of oil fields off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada, the government put in place a legal regime
designed to require investors engaging in development of the offshore resources to make expenditures for research
and development (R&D) and education and training (E&T) in the local province. These and other requirements were
enacted in the 1987 “Accord Act”. When Canada concluded the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it listed
the Accord Act as an exception to the treaty’s restrictions on performance requirements. The NAFTA also included
within that exception any “subordinate measure adopted or maintained under the authority of and consistent with
the [Accord Act]”. Pursuant to the Act, Canadian officials issued guidelines that sought to impose additional and
stronger requirements with regard to R&D and E&T. Mobil objected, arguing that the new guidelines violated the
NAFTA’s prohibitions on performance requirements. The investment tribunal agreed, adopting a broad view of the
restrictions contained in that treaty, and a correspondingly narrow view of the relevant exceptions thereto.

Undermining Good Governance and Equality before the Law
The system for governing extractive industry projects is often complex by design. Different
entities have responsibilities over their areas of authority and expertise, charged with ensuring,
for instance, that the project does not generate undue environmental harm and complies with
environmental law and policy; that the project generates tax revenue; that it drives economic
diversification; that it creates sustainable and quality jobs; and that governance of the project
complies with domestic and international norms regarding transparency, accountability,
and participation. Approval of the project by one government entity, and at one point in the
process, does not mean that the project will be able to proceed. Similarly, rejection by one
entity, and at one point in the process, does not mean that the project is doomed. Rather, there
are commonly periods of contestation through which diverse interests and complex issues can
be raised, evaluated, adjudicated, and challenged.
Investment treaty claims against governments allow investors, and investors alone, to exit the
domestic legal system at any point when a decision or the process is unfavorable to them, and
take their issue to a forum where they are able to reframe the law and facts, and exclude other
voices and interests. For instance, if a domestic environmental group successfully challenges
the grant of an extractive industry permit on the ground that it violates environmental norms,17
the investor is able to challenge that court decision before an ISDS tribunal; the environmental
group in the underlying domestic law proceeding is excluded from the ISDS dispute; and, as
ISDS tribunals have interpreted investment treaties, the tribunals are not bound by, and can
undo the effects of, the domestic court decision even if there is no evidence of corruption,
fraud, discrimination, or other outcome-determinative failings at the domestic law level.
This, in turn, creates an unpredictable system where decisions on proposed projects depend
not on the domestic policy objectives, laws, or regulations governing extractive industry
projects, but whether and to what extent foreign investors are able to seek a better outcome
from a system of law favorable to foreign investors’ economic interests. As a result, the voice,
interests, and rights of other stakeholders are marginalized.

Imposing Financial Liability
The financial implications of investor-state arbitrations can be significant whether host
states win or lose (see Box 4 and Table 2).
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

16 See e.g. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia,
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18), Decision
on Jurisdiction, July 6, 2007; RDC v.
Guatemala (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23).
Note that some tribunals have determined
that an investor cannot benefit from the
protections of an investment treaty if there
is evidence that the investor procured its
investment through fraud or corruption.
Tribunals have otherwise bound
governments to contracts whose illegality
arises from other grounds, including ultra
vires conduct.
17 These facts are analogous to the case of
Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/5.
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Box 4: Outsized Damages in TCC v. Pakistan
In the 2019 case Tethyan Copper Company (TCC) v. Pakistan, damages of USD 4.1 billion were awarded to the
investor, not including interest. Pakistan’s legal fees amounted to USD 25.5 million. In addition to its own fees,
Pakistan was ordered to pay the claimant’s legal costs in their entirety (USD 59.5 million) and the arbitration fees
(over USD 3.7 million). Pakistan is considered a lower-middle income country, and had received a USD 6 billion
bailout from the International Monetary Fund just months before the award was issued. The costs of the case
against TCC amounted to 1.4% of the country’s overall GDP.
Table 2: Examples of Awards and Expenses for Litigation and Arbitration in Extractive Industry ISDS Cases
Case Name and Number

Amount respondent
state ordered to
pay to claimant

Amount expressed
as a percentage of
host state GDP18

Amount in legal/expert fees and arbitration
costs born by the respondent state

Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A.v. Arab Republic
of Egypt

Damages: USD 2 billion,
plus interest

Damages: 0.8% GDP

Respondent legal fees: USD 1.8 million
Claimant fees borne by respondent: USD 10 million
All arbitration fees borne by respondent: USD 690,080

Stans Energy Corp. and Kutisay Mining
LLC v. Kyrgyz Republic (I)

Damages: USD 117.7
million, plus interest

Damages: 1.32% GDP

Respondent legal fees: USD 5.3 million
Claimant fees borne by respondent: USD 3.2 million
2/3 arbitration fees borne by respondent: USD 909,088

Tethyan Copper Company Pty Limited
v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Damages: USD 4.1 billion,
plus interest

Damages: 1.47% GDP

Respondent legal fees: USD 25.5 million
Claimant fees borne by respondent: USD 59 million
All arbitration fees borne by respondent: USD 3.7 million

Khan Resources v. Mongolia

Damages: USD 80 million,
plus interest

Damages: 0.68% GDP

Respondent legal fees: Unknown
Claimant legal fees borne by respondent: USD 8.7 million
All arbitration fees borne by respondent: USD 730,778

Anatolie and Gabriel Stati, Ascom
Group S.A., Terra Raf Trans Trading Ltd
v. Kazakhstan

Damages: USD 508
million, plus interest

Damages: 0.21% GDP

Respondent legal fees: USD 17.6 million
Claimant legal fees borne by respondent: USD 8.9 million
¾ arbitration fees borne by respondent: USD 920,866

Tidewater Investment SRL and
Tidewater Caribe, C.A. v. Venezuela

Damages: USD 46.4
million

Damages: 0.014% GDP

Respondent legal fees: USD 9 million
Claimant legal fees borne by respondent: USD 2.5 million
Arbitration fees borne by respondent: Unknown

Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela

Damages: USD 713
million, plus interest

Damages: 0.15% GDP

Respondent legal fees: USD 12.8 million
Claimant legal fees borne by respondent: USD 5 million
½ of the costs of the arbitration: Unknown

Occidental Petroleum Corporation and
Occidental Exploration and Production
Company v. Ecuador (II)

Damages: USD 1.1 billion,
plus interest19

Damages: 1.25% GDP

Respondent legal fees in arbitration proceedings: Unknown
Claimant legal fees borne by respondent in arbitration
proceedings: None
Respondent legal fees in annulment proceedings: USD 5.6 million
½ of the costs of arbitration: Unknown

Yukos Cases ((1) Hulley Enterprises
Ltd. v. Russian Federation; (2) Veteran
Petroleum Limited v. Russia; and (3)
Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v.
Russia)

Damages: USD 50 billion,
plus interest

Damages: 2.43% GDP

Respondent legal fees in arbitration proceedings: USD 27
million
Litigation and arbitration fees and costs: USD 71.5 million
All arbitration fees borne by respondent: USD 9.7 million

Vannessa Ventures Ltd v. Venezuela

None – state prevailed in
dispute

N/A

Over USD 15 million

18 Calculations based on host state gross
domestic product (GDP) for the year in
which the award was issued, per World Bank
figures, available at http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table.
19 This amount was reduced in annulment
proceedings from an original award of USD
1.8 billion, plus interest.
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Exclusion of Local Perspectives
and Participation in ISDS

By nature, extractives projects have wide-reaching impacts on surrounding communities.
The projects underpinning these claims necessarily implicate land rights, access to
(potable) water, impacts on biodiversity, cultural impacts, and other dimensions of
health, environment, livelihoods, and rights. In several cases, investor claims themselves
address either the impact on an investment by third parties (invoking full protection and
security provisions when there is disruption to activities from protests, for example, or
challenging a requirement to consult with communities) or a state’s inability to protect
an investment from such disruption.20 Furthermore, the financial and reputational and
financial risks of ISDS may disincentivize states from meaningfully defending the rights of
affected third-parties. ISDS claims have also resulted in legal interpretations by tribunals
or remedies which adversely impact human rights and other third-party interests.21
Despite the importance of local perspectives on the issues at stake in ISDS – and the
substantial implication of the awards and outcomes (or the effects of regulatory chill22
from threatened cases) on local communities — third-party participation in investment
disputes is extremely limited.
Third parties may request to participate as amici curiae. It is up to the tribunal to
decide whether or not an amicus submission will be accepted, and the requirements
for acceptance can be prohibitively narrow in scope.23 Even when a submission to
participate is accepted, it only provides a limited opportunity for third parties to provide
context deemed relevant by the tribunal, and is not meant to grant substantive remedy
to affected rightsholders.24
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20 For example, see GCM Mining Corp v.
Colombia (ICSID Case No. ARB/18/23)
where the investor, a Canadian mining
company, alleged that the former South
American state failed to protect its assets
from coercive actions produced illegal
miners located in the zone where its
subsidiary was conducting an extractive
project. Table 3 provides further cases in
which third-party rights were raised in
proceedings.
21 For more on the rights of thirdparties in ISDS, see Jesse Coleman,
Lise Johnson, Brooke Güven, Lorenzo
Cotula and Thierry Berger, ThirdParty Rights in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Options for Reform, (CCSI,
IISD, and IIED), https://scholarship.law.
columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_
staffpubs/150/#:~:text=Third%20Party%20
Rights%20in%20Investor,also%20
offering%20examples%20of%20
procedural.
22 For further discussion of ISDS and
regulatory chill, see, Kyla Tienhaara,
“Regulatory Chill in a Warming World : The
Threat to Climate Policy Posed by InvestorState Dispute Settlement,” Transnational
Environmental Law 2, (2018) 229-250;
Julia Brown, “International Investment
Agreements: Regulatory Chill in the Face
of Litigious Heat?” 3 Western Journal of
Legal Studies 1 (2013); Gus Van Harten and
Dayna Nadine Scott, “Investment Treaties
and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory
Proposals: A Case Study from Canada,” 7
Journal of International Dispute Settlement
1, (2016) 92-116.
23 In Eco Oro v. Colombia, for example,
the tribunal denied an amicus curiae
submission presented by the Committee
for the Defense of Water and the
Páramo de Santurbán alongside several
international organizations. Eco Oro v.
Colombia (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41),
Procedural Order No. 6.
24 See Katia Fach Gómez, “Rethinking
the Role of Amicus Curiae in International
Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the
Line Favorably for the Public Interest,” 2
Fordham International Law Journal Vol.
35, (2012) 509-564; Nathalie Bernascoini,
Martin Dietrich Brauch, Howard Mann,
“Civil Society and International Investment
Arbitration: Tracing the Evolution of
Concern,” (eds) Thomas Schultz and
Federico Ortino, The Oxford Handbook of
International Arbitration (2020).
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Table 3: Examples of Extractives Cases in which the Rights of Third Parties were Raised

Case Name
and Number

Year Lodged
- Year
Determined

Home
state of
investor

Subsector

Notes on Third Party Rights

Amount
Claimed

Outcome

Award

Glamis Gold v.
United States

2003 - 2009

Canada

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

The U.S. referred in its defense to the
rights of Native Americans under U.S.
Law. An amicus brief submitted by the
Quechan Indian Nation, which was
accepted, argued that the tribunal
should interpret NAFTA in a way that
is consistent with U.S. obligations
under conventional and customary
international law.

USD 50
million

Decided in
favor of state

-

Chevron and
TexPet v.
Ecuador (II)

2006 - 2011

United
States

Extraction
of crude
petroleum
and natural
gas

Company’s claim challenged an
Ecuadorian court decision that Texaco
(later merged with Chevron) was
liable for toxic wastewater dumping
and oil spills in the Amazon.

USD 649
million

Decided
in favor of
investor

USD 77.7
million

Burlington
Resources v.
Republic of
Ecuador

2008 - 2017

United
States

Extraction
of crude
petroleum
and natural
gas

Ecuador filed successful counterclaim
alleging breaches by company of
Ecuadorian environmental law.

USD 1515.6
million

Decided
in favor of
investor

USD 379.8
million

Perenco
Ecuador Limited
v. Republic
of Ecuador
(Petroecuador)

2008 - 2019

Bahamas

Extraction
of crude
petroleum
and natural
gas

Ecuador filed successful counterclaim
to cover costs of environmental
remediation from Perenco’s oil blocks.

USD 1423
million

Decided
in favor of
investor

USD 416.5
million

Clayton and
Bilcon of
Delaware Inc. v.
Government of
Canada

2008 - 2019

United
States

Other
mining and
quarrying

Claimants’ proposed project drew
substantial local opposition, and was
rejected by a joint provincial/federal
environmental assessment panel. The
investors sued in response.

USD 443.40
million

Decided
in favor of
investor

USD 7
million

Pac Rim Cayman
LLC v. Republic of
El Salvador

2009 - 2016

United
States

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

Claimant failed to submit
environmental permit and faced
community opposition due to
health concerns of mining activities.
Company filed claim after state
refused to issue exploitation
concession.

USD 314
million

Decided in
favor of state

-

Copper
Mesa Mining
Corporation
v. Republic of
Ecuador

2011 - 2016

Canada

Mining of
metal ores
(copper)

Claim brought by locals in Ontario
courts against Copper Mesa for
alleged harassment and threats of
violence.

USD 69.7
million

Decided
in favor of
investor

USD 19.4
million

South
American Silver
Limited v. The
Plurinational
State of Bolivia

2013 - 2018

Bermuda

Mining of
metal ores
(silver)

Tensions between local communities
and company officials led to
violence. The government reached
an agreement with Indigenous
communities, claiming state
ownership of mining concessions.

USD 385.7
million

Decided
in favor of
investor

USD 18.7
million

Bear Creek
Mining v.
Republic of Peru

2014 - 2017

Canada

Mining of
metal ores
(silver)

Presidential permission for
acquirement of mine revoked citing a
need to preserve “environmental and
social conditions” in the region.

USD 522.2
million

Decided
in favor of
investor

USD 18.2
million

Infinito Gold Ltd
v. Republic of
Costa Rica

2014 - Pending

Canada

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

Concession was granted before
approval of EIA. Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Costa Rica determined the claimant’s
concession violated Costa Rican
Constitution, namely the right to a
healthy environment.

USD 93.8
million

-

-
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Table 3 (continuation): Examples of Extractives Cases in which the Rights of Third Parties were Raised
Case Name
and Number

Year Lodged
- Year
Determined

Home
state of
investor

Subsector

Notes on Third Party Rights

Amount
Claimed

Outcome

Award

Gabriel
Resources Ltd.
and Gabriel
Resources
(Jersey) v.
Romania

2015 - Pending

Canada;
United
Kingdom

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

Romania denied claimant’s
environmental impact assessment
and refused to issue environmental
permits for operation of the mine,
partially in response to resistance to
the mine from environmental groups.

USD 3285.7
million

-

-

Eco Oro Minerals
Corp v. Republic
of Colombia

2016 - Pending

Canada

Mining of
metal ores
(gold and
silver)

Colombia Constitutional Court
ordered that mining activities in
protected páramos (wetland) regions
be prohibited.

USD 764
million

-

-

Cosigo
Resources,
Ltd., Cosigo
Resources
Sucursal
Colombia,
Tobie Mining
and Energy, Inc.
v. Republic of
Colombia

2016 - Pending

United
States

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

Colombia published a reso-lution
creating the Yaigojé Apaporis national
park, encompassing the area of the
mining concession.

USD 16511
million

-

-

Kingsgate
Consolidated
Ltd v. The
Kingdom of
Thailand

2017 - Pending

Australia

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

Thai government issued a moratorium
on gold mining, citing public
health concerns, and did not renew
claimant’s processing license.

-

-

-

South32 S.A. v.
Colombia

2020 - Pending

United
Kingdom

Mining of
metal ores
(nickel);
manufacture
of basic
metals

Company filed claim after it was
ordered by state to reapply for
environmental license and carry out
community consultations after a 2015
study found harmful health impacts
on local communities due to mining
activities

-

-

-

Barrick (PD)
Gold Australia
Pty v. Papua
New Guinea

Notice of
dispute filed
2020

Australia

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

Claim filed after state did not
renew license to operate, alleging
environmental damage.

-

-

-

Ecuagoldmining
v. Republic of
Ecuador

Notice of
dispute filed
2020

China

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

Gold mining project halted due to
community protests. Community
obtained order from local courts
directing claimant to suspend
operations.

-

-

-

Lupaka Gold v.
Republic of Peru

Notice of
dispute filed
2020

Canada

Mining of
metal ores
(gold)

Company claims the state failed
to support the company against
blockades and protests led by the
community of Parán.

-

-

-

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

JULY 2022

13

Reform Options for
Investment Treaties

States should carefully consider their reasons for signing investment treaties and define
the scope and content of these agreements to advance their policy goals and protect their
ability to regulate in the public interest. These considerations apply equally to existing
treaties as well as to any new treaties, though the avenues of reform differ. Policy-makers
could consider the following steps toward aligning their investment treaties with their
development objectives:
▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

▶

Assess both costs and benefits of their existing investment treaties, including the
impacts of treaties on states’ ability to regulate in the public interest.25
Establish a set of achievable domestic and international development priorities, and
identify ways in which foreign investment can be shaped to serve these objectives.26
Create processes for the design of investment treaties, decision-making around treaty
reform, and the resolution of investment-related disputes, in a way that allows all
relevant stakeholders to meaningfully participate.
Consider terminating treaties that are mis-aligned with national objectives,27 either
by terminating the treaties or withdrawing consent to arbitration.28
When choosing to keep an existing treaty, clarify broad or vague provisions by issuing
unilateral or joint interpretive statements.29
Consider incorporating into new or revised treaties binding investor obligations
regarding human rights and other responsible investment standards, or existing
standards such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.30
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25 Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Brooke Güven
and Jesse Coleman, Costs and Benefits of
Investment Treaties: Practical Considerations
for States, (CCSI, 2018) https://ccsi.columbia.
edu/sites/default/files/content/pics/
Cost-and-Benefits-of-Investment-TreatiesPractical-Considerations-for-States-ENG-mr.
pdf; Joachim Pohl, Societal benefits and
costs of International Investment Agreements:
A critical review of aspects and available
empirical evidence, (OECD Working Papers on
International Investment, 2018) https://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/
societal-benefits-and-costs-of-internationalinvestment-agreements_e5f85c3d-en.
26 Lise Johnson, Brooke Güven, and Jesse
Coleman, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
What Are We Trying to Achieve? Does ISDS
Get Us There? (CCSI, 2017) https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/news/investor-state-disputesettlement-what-are-we-trying-achieve-doesisds-get-us-there; Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs
and Nathan Lobel, “Aligning International
Investment Agreements with the Sustainable
Development Goals,” Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law, Vol. 58 (2019).
27 In 2014, South Africa terminated its BITs
with Austria, Denmark and Germany, and
Indonesia terminated 18 of its 64 BITs.
See UNCTAD, World Investment Report
2015: Reforming International Investment
Governance (2015), http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf.
28 Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Brooke Güven,
and Jesse Coleman, Clearing the Path:
Withdrawal of Consent and Termination
as Next Steps for Reforming International
Investment Law, (CCSI, 2018) https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/content/clearing-pathwithdrawal-consent-and-termination-nextsteps-reforming-international; Brooke
Güven, Lise Johnson, Draft Treaty Language:
Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate and
Termination of International Investment
Agreements, (CCSI, IIED, and IISD, 2019)
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/content/docs/our%20focus/uncitralsubmission-termination-withdrawal-en.pdf.
29 Ladan Mehranvar and Lise Johnson,
“Missing Masters: Causes, Consequences, and
Corrections for States’ Disengagement from
the Investment Treaty System” (forthcoming,
2022); Lise Johnson, Aligning Swiss Investment
Treaties with Sustainable Development: An
assessment of current policy coherence and
options for future action, (CCSI, 2015) https://
ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/
docs/our%20work/Aligning-Swiss-IIAs-withSD-CCSI-June-2016-1-1.pdf.
30 OECD, Guidelines for multinational
enterprises, 2011, OECD Publishing https://
www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.
pdf; UN OHCHR UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, 2011, United
Nations https://www.ohchr.org/documents/
publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_
en.pdf.
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▶

▶

Participate in international reform of investment treaties and ISDS, including, for
instance, at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Working Group III and ICSID.31
Promote international efforts to overcome transnational governance challenges
related to international investment, including efforts to combat incentives schemes
and other provisions that foster races to the bottom; close governance gaps that erode
tax bases and externalize harms; address challenges posed to the global commons
such as the climate crisis;32 and the establishment of a legally binding instrument on
transnational corporations.33

In all cases, states should be cognizant of the varied and significant implications of
international investment law for the governance of investments in the extractive industries
sector, and of the ways in which this rapidly expanding body of law can influence whether,
when, and how foreign investment in this sector contributes to sustainable development.

31 See “Working Group III: InvestorState Dispute Settlement Reform,”
UNCITRAL, https://uncitral.un.org/en/
working_groups/3/investor-state; ICSID,
ICSID Rules and Regulations Amendment
Process, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
resources/rules-amendments. For more on
the substantive negotiations in UNCITRAL’s
Working Group III, including CCSI’s
engagement with the Working Group, see:
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/ccsiand-uncitrals-working-group-iii-investorstate-dispute-settlement-reform.
32 Lise Johnson, Aligning Swiss Investment
Treaties with Sustainable Development:
An assessment of current policy coherence
and options for future action, (CCSI, 2015)
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/content/docs/our%20work/AligningSwiss-IIAs-with-SD-CCSI-June-2016-1-1.pdf.
33 Lise Johnson, Brooke Güven, and Jesse
Coleman, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
What Are We Trying to Achieve? Does ISDS
Get Us There? (CCSI, 2017) https://ccsi.
columbia.edu/news/investor-state-disputesettlement-what-are-we-trying-achievedoes-isds-get-us-there.
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Glossary
A list of key protections provided by international investment law and their definitions:
1. Non-discrimination: The obligation not to discriminate among or between investors
is found in almost all investment treaties. It usually consists of two relative standards,
which require that the host state treat foreign investors no less favorably than: (1)
domestic investors (also referred to as the “national treatment” obligation); and
(2) other foreign investors (also referred to as the “most-favored nation”, or MFN,
treatment obligation).
2. Expropriation: Expropriation generally falls into two categories: direct and
indirect. Direct expropriation involves “the physical taking or nationalization of an
enterprise, which usually involves a transfer of ownership to the state.”34 While it
can take various forms, indirect expropriation is generally understood as an action
or measure taken by the state that has the effect of depriving the investor of the
benefit of its investment, while not resulting in the transfer of ownership. Investment
treaties typically recognize that governments may lawfully expropriate property,
but require that any expropriation must be “promptly, adequately, and effectively”
compensated.
3. Fair and equitable treatment: Tribunals have struggled to interpret and apply this
vague standard, as most treaties typically give no clear guidance regarding its
meaning. Some tribunals have adopted a relatively narrow approach, concluding
that states will only be liable if their conduct is egregious and shocking.35 Others
have interpreted the provision much more broadly, establishing a high standard
that requires host states not to act in a manner that affects the “basic” or “legitimate
expectations” that were taken into account by the foreign investor when making the
investment.36 Investors have relied extensively on this broad interpretation of FET in
challenging the conduct of host states. Indeed, this provision has become a “catchall” clause, allowing investors to succeed where their other claims (for example in
relation to expropriation) fail.37
4. Umbrella clause: this provision can require the host state to comply with certain
obligations or commitments owed to (or entered into with) investors or investments.38
Any clear interpretation of the umbrella clause remains elusive because the specific
wording of these clauses often varies from treaty to treaty, and even clauses with
identical wording have been given different interpretations by arbitral tribunals.
According to some tribunals, investors can use umbrella clauses to enforce any
obligation owed by the state, which can include obligations owed under other areas
of international law, general domestic law, or under specific investor-state contracts.
Other tribunals have interpreted the provision more narrowly, concluding that
umbrella clauses only allow an investor to enforce obligations owed specifically to it
under an investor-state contract.
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34 Ibid., p. 15.
35 See e.g. Glamis Gold v. United States,
UNCITRAL, Award, June 8, 2009.
36 See e.g. Tecmed v. Mexico (ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2), Award, May 29,
2003, para.154 (government conduct
must be “free from ambiguity and
totally transparent” so that the investor
may know all the relevant rules and
regulations, and their respective goals,
before investing); and Occidental v.
Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11),
Award, July 1, 2004, paras. 185-186, 190191 (the FET obligation enables review of
the correctness of domestic court and/
or administrative determinations, and
requires “stability and predictability” and
“certainly entails an obligation not to alter
the legal and business environment in
which the investment has been made”).
37 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Aaron
Cosbey, Damon Vis-Dunbar, Lise Johnson,
Investment Treaties and Why They Matter
to Sustainable Development: Questions
and Answers, (IISD, 2011), p. 12 https://
www.iisd.org/publications/investmenttreaties-and-why-they-matter-sustainabledevelopment-questions-and-answers.
38 It seems that states have become
increasingly reluctant to include such
provisions in newly drafted treaties: of the
treaties concluded in 2014, all omitted
such a clause. See UNCTAD, “Recent
Trends in IIAs and ISDS” (IIA Issues Note
No. 1, February 2015), at p. 3 http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf.
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5. Restrictions on performance requirements: A performance requirement “is a
condition that investors must meet in order to establish or operate a business, or to
obtain some advantage offered by the host state.”39 Examples include mandatory
or incentive-based requirements that investors: (1) use or accord a preference to
local providers of goods or services; (2) make expenditures in the host country on
research and development or education and training; or (3) hire a certain number or
percentage of local employees. These investment treaty provisions limit the number
of options available to states to try to ensure that foreign investment produces
development benefits in the host state.
6. Full protection and security: This standard has frequently been interpreted by ISDS
tribunals to obligate the host state to provide physical protection and security to
the investor, including from actions by the host state and third parties (such as local
communities).40 Inaction by the host state is not sufficient to meet this obligation—
rather, active conduct by the state to protect the investor is required.41 The
Government of Ecuador was found to be in breach of this protection in Copper Mesa
v. Ecuador, for its “negligence” in effectively protecting the investment concessions
from blockades formed by human rights defenders protesting the mining activities.
Damages were reduced in acknowledgement of the government’s having fired live
rounds at the protestors, but it was still found to have failed to “impose its will on the
anti-miners, acting with all the powers and forces available to a sovereign State…”. 42
This inaction, according to the tribunal, contributed to the project’s failure.
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